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Abstract	
Our	inner	space	is	furnished,	and	sometimes	even	stuffed,	with	verbal	material.	 	The	nature	of	inner	language	has	long	been	under	the	careful	scrutiny	of	scholars,	philosophers	and	writers,	through	the	practice	of	introspection.	The	use	of	recent	experimental	methods	in	 the	 field	 of	 cognitive	 neuroscience	 provides	 a	 new	window	 of	 insight	 into	 the	 format,	properties,	 qualities	 and	 mechanisms	 of	 inner	 language.	 Gathering	 findings	 from	introspection	and	empirical	works,	this	article	first	assesses	the	proportion	of	language	in	our	inner	space.	Several	variants	of	 inner	language	are	then	described,	 including	wilful	vs	spontaneous	instances,	condensed	vs	expanded	forms,	silent	vocalisation	during	reading	or	writing,	contained	vs	ruminative	occurrences,	and	self-controlled	vs	hallucinatory	cases.	The	nature	of	these	variants	and	their	embodied	multisensory	qualities	are	examined.	Finally,	a	neurocognitive	model	of	 the	 production	 of	 inner	 language	 is	 drawn,	 in	 the	 framework	 of	predictive	 control,	 speculating	 on	 the	 neural	mechanisms	 that	 underlie	 one	 of	 the	 most	significant	components	of	our	inner	space.		
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Introduction	
Our	inner	space	is	furnished	with	verbal	material	which	contributes	to	enriching	our	inner	life.	Our	internal	voice	plays	a	central	role	in	self-awareness,	helping	us	to	remember	our	past,	to	imagine	and	plan	our	future,	to	interpret	our	present	environment,	to	get	a	better	control	 of	 situations,	 to	 solve	 problems,	 to	 encourage,	 comfort	 or	 regulate	 ourselves.	Engaging	 in	 mental	 verbalisation	 shapes	 our	 inner	 existence	 and	 is	 instrumental	 in	 the	maintenance	of	a	coherent	self-narrative.		The	 claim	 that	 our	mental	 space	 contains	 inner	 verbalisation	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	Ancient	 Egyptian	 sages	 and	 Ancient	 Greek	 philosophers.	 Early	 Medieval	 scholars	 were	inspired	 from	 these	 ancient	 views	 on	 inner	 experience.	 Augustine’s	 Confessions,	 which	appeared	in	397-398,	are	considered	as	the	first	book	using	a	subjective	tone	and	focusing	on	inner	experience.	In	the	Confessions	and	in	many	of	Augustine’s	later	works,	it	seems	that	language	invades	the	author’s	inner	space.		Since	then,	inner	language	has	been	under	the	scrutiny	of	philosophers,	writers,	poets,	filmmakers,	artists,	 literary	scholars,	psychoanalysts,	and	linguists,	through	the	practice	of	careful	 introspection	 and	 reflection.	 Their	 investigations	 suggest	 that	 silent	 self-talk	 and	inner	dialogues	or	conversations	take	an	important	part	of	our	inner	space.	Inner	language	is	often	reported	as	pervasive	or	even	ubiquitous.	The	French	philosopher,	psychologist	and	epistemologist	Victor	Egger	for	instance	claimed:	A	tout	instant,	l’âme	parle	intérieurement	sa	pensée.	Ce	fait,	méconnu	par	la	plupart	des	psychologues,	est	un	des	éléments	les	plus	importants	de	notre	existence.	Il	accompagne	la	presque	 totalité	de	nos	actes	 ;	 la	 série	des	mots	 intérieurs	 forme	une	succession	presque	continue,	parallèle	à	la	succession	des	autres	faits	psychiques	;	à	elle	seule	elle	retient	donc	une	partie	considérable	de	la	conscience	de	chacun	de	nous.	1	(Egger,	1881,	p.	1).	John	 Locke	 (1970)	 similarly	 asserted:	 “it	 is	 in	 constant	 use,	 accompanying	 many	language-related	activities	such	as	writing,	silent	reading,	learning,	thinking,	listening	and,	
                                               1	 At	 every	 moment,	 the	 soul	 is	 speaking	 its	 thought	 internally.	 This	 fact,	 ill-recognized	 by	 many	psychologists,	is	one	of	the	most	important	elements	of	our	existence.	It	accompanies	nearly	all	of	our	acts;	the	series	of	interior	words	forms	a	nearly	continuous	succession,	in	parallel	with	the	succession	of	other	psychic	facts;	it	thus	retains,	in	itself,	a	considerable	part	of	our	consciousness.	
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possibly,	dreaming.”	(Locke,	1970,	p.	7).	Such	a	stance	is	also	taken	by	the	linguist	Gabriel	Bergounioux	(2001,	p.	107):	Pas	d'activité	vigile	qui	ne	soit	accompagnée	d'une	sonorisation	 intériorisée,	 fût-elle	réduite	 aux	 inepties	 de	 l'avant-sommeil,	 aux	 remembrances	 du	 vieillard	 idiot,	 à	 un	ressassement	ou	une	ritournelle,	et	pas	non	plus	d'activité	onirique.2	A	similarly	extreme	position	is	taken	by	Baars	(2003)	who	claimed	that	“Overt	speech	takes	up	perhaps	a	 tenth	of	 the	waking	day;	but	 inner	speech	goes	on	all	 the	 time”.	Even	Chomsky	affirmed:	“Now	let	us	take	language.	What	is	its	characteristic	use?	Well,	probably	99.9%	of	its	use	is	internal	to	the	mind.	You	can’t	go	a	minute	without	talking	to	yourself.	It	takes	an	incredible	act	of	will	not	to	talk	to	yourself”.	(Chomsky,	2012,	p.	11).	Some	of	these	introspective	accounts	can	be	examined,	tested	and	complemented	using	recent	 experimental	 methods	 and	 technology	 developed	 in	 psychology	 and	 cognitive	neuroscience.	Findings	from	these	latter	fields	may	provide	a	new	window	of	insight	into	the	format,	properties,	qualities	and	mechanisms	of	inner	language	and	may	allow	us	to	better	describe	what	our	inner	space	consists	of.		In	this	article,	introspective	views	of	inner	language	are	juxtaposed	with	empirical	data,	many	of	which	are	reviewed	elsewhere,	e.g.	in	Perrone-Bertolotti	et	al.	(2014),	Alderson-Day	&	Fernyhough	(2015)	or	Lœvenbruck	et	al.	(2018).		This	 article	 first	 assesses	 the	 significance	 of	 language	 in	 our	 inner	 space	 and	 the	proportion	it	takes.	Several	variants	of	inner	language	are	then	described,	including	wilful	vs	spontaneous	instances,	condensed	vs	expanded	forms,	silent	vocalisation	during	reading	or	writing,	contained	vs	ruminative	occurrences,	and	self-controlled	vs	hallucinatory	cases.	It	is	then	 shown	 that	 some	 variants	 of	 inner	 language	 have	 multisensory	 qualities,	 with	 the	presence	of	auditory,	somatosensory	and	visual	elements.	It	is	argued	that	wilful	versions	of	inner	 language	may	 recruit	 also	motor	 processes.	 Finally,	 a	 neurocognitive	model	 of	 the	production	of	inner	language	is	drawn,	in	the	framework	of	predictive	control,	speculating	on	the	neural	mechanisms	that	underlie	one	of	the	most	significant	components	of	our	inner	
                                               
2 No	wakeful	activity	is	unaccompanied	by	some	interiorised	sound,	be	it	pre-sleep	nonsense,	a	foolish	old	man’s	reminiscing,	brooding	or	a	music	earworm,	and	no	oneiric	activity	either.	
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space.	
1. The	importance	of	inner	language	in	our	inner	space	
1.1 Evidence	for	the	occurrence	of	inner	language	Inner	language	is	claimed	to	be	an	essential	part	of	our	inner	space.	But	is	our	inner	space	filled	with	language,	with	all	of	its	clothes,	or	rather	by	meaning?	Can	we	find	evidence	that	this	mental	activity	that	we	refer	to	as	inner	language	is	indeed	spelled	out	in	a	linguistic	form,	 that	 it	 does	 use	 ordinary	words	 and	 syntax?	 Augustine	 himself	made	 a	 distinction	between	the	verbum	in	corde,	the	interior	verbalisation,	and	the	locutio,	the	exteriorised	oral	form	(Cary,	2011;	Panaccio,	2014).	If	the	latter	obviously	uses	words	and	is	expressed	in	a	given	language,	the	former,	according	to	Augustine	(in	De	Trinitate)	is	universal,	it	precedes	overt	language	production,	and	it	is	not	associated	with	any	particular	language.	As	we	will	see	below	(in	1.2)	several	introspective	works	and	language	impairment	case	reports	suggest	indeed	that	cognitive	activity	can	occur	without	using	natural	language.	Yet,	introspectively,	we	 can	 sometimes	 hear	 a	 little	 voice	 in	 our	 head.	 Is	 these	 instances,	 is	 our	 little	 voice	expressed	in	a	given	language,	is	it	shaped	by	the	language(s)	we	use?		Examining	 inner	experience	 in	bilingual	and	multilingual	speakers	can	contribute	to	better	qualifying	our	inner	space.	In	her	book	entitled	“The	Bilingual	Mind”,	Pavlenko	(2014)	dedicated	a	chapter	to	bilingualism	and	inner	speech,	in	which	she	reviews	several	studies	of	inner	language	use	in	bilingual	and	multilingual	speakers.	Another	survey	by	Dewaele	(2015)	provides	 further	 interesting	 data.	 These	 reviews	 show	 that	 the	 age	 of	 acquisition	 of	 the	second	language	(L2)	(or	of	the	third,	fourth,	fifth,	or	more	languages,	LX)	is	a	strong	factor	in	 determining	which	 language	 is	 dominant	 in	 the	 inner	 speech	 of	 participants.	 Another	factor	 is	 the	 linguistic	 context	 of	 the	 cognitive	 event	 entertained	 in	 the	 inner	 speech.	Autobiographical	memory	retrievals	tend	to	be	mentally	uttered	in	the	language	used	when	the	event	 took	place.	Context	of	acquisition	and	socialisation	are	 factors	 that	 facilitate	 the	shift	from	L1	to	LX	in	inner	speech.	Acquiring	the	LX	in	a	naturalistic	environment	(rather	than	an	instructed	setting)	will	increase	its	use	in	inner	speech.	Self-perceived	proficiency	also	influences	the	language	choice	in	inner	speech	and	mental	activities	(mental	calculation,	reasoning).	Higher	frequency	of	social	speech	in	the	LX	also	increases	the	likelihood	of	its	use	
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for	inner	speech.	Inner	LX	use	is	also	proportional	to	the	size	of	the	speaker’s	social	network	in	LX.	The	dominant	language	in	inner	speech	is	also	predicted	by	length	of	residence	in	the	new	country	and	the	language	predominantly	used	in	overt	speech.	In	a	very	recent	study,	Resnik	 (2018)	 has	 found	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 these	 factors	 (high	 frequency	 of	 L2	 use,	naturalistic	exposure	to	L2,	high	self-reported	proficiency	in	L2),	a	high	bilingualism	index	and	the	overall	number	of	languages	known	all	contributed	to	boost	L2	use	in	inner	speech.	As	shown	in	the	growing	number	of	studies	on	inner	speech	in	multilingual	speakers,	our	inner	space	does	seem	to	contain	verbal	material	that	is	not	abstract,	or	purely	semantic,	but	expressed	in	given	natural	languages,	with	full	syntactic	and	lexical	clothing.	Our	inner	space	incorporates	our	cultural,	social	and	linguistic	environment.	
1.2 Other	components	of	inner	space:	images,	emotions,	sensations,	unsymbolised	
elements	It	seems	safe	to	conclude	that	our	inner	space	is	furnished	with	an	important	amount	of	verbal	material.	But	how	much?	Although	the	contention	that	inner	language	is	pervasive	is	widely	held,	quantitative	descriptions	of	its	occurrence	in	the	general	population	are	more	nuanced.	In	a	thought	sampling	study,	Klinger	&	Cox	(1987)	had	students	carry	a	beeper	for	up	 to	seven	days	and	describe	properties	of	 their	mental	 content	at	 each	 random	beeper	signal.	They	found	that	51%	of	thought	samples	contained	some	interior	monologue.	Even	lower	occurrences	are	found	when	using	more	careful	inner	experience	sampling.	Hurlburt	has	 created	 a	method,	 called	 Descriptive	 Experience	 Sampling	 (DES),	 designed	 to	 obtain	more	 accurate	 accounts	 of	 inner	 experience	 (Hurlburt,	 1993;	 2011).	 Traditional	questionnaires	on	inner	experience	are	biased,	since	participants	use	language	to	describe	their	 experience,	 which	 places	 them	 in	 a	 verbal	 thinking	 mode	 and	 leads	 them	 to	overestimate	 the	amount	of	 inner	speech.	 In	addition,	questionnaires	 contain	pre-defined	questions,	which	can	orient	the	participants’	descriptions.	Instead,	DES	does	not	specify	in	advance	what	characteristics	to	explore.	After	having	carried	the	beeper	for	a	day	and	having	jotted	down	notes	about	their	inner	experience	before	each	beep,	subjects	participate	in	an	“expositional	 interview”	with	 the	 investigators,	during	which	 they	are	guided	 to	describe	their	inner	experience	with	the	highest	possible	fidelity.	This	sequence	of	beeped	reports	and	detailed	interviewing	is	repeated,	leading	to	increasing	skill	in	the	reporting.	Using	DES	with	
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hundreds	of	people	for	more	than	thirty	years,	Hurlburt	and	colleagues	have	routinely	met	participants	 who	 reported	 no	moments	 of	 inner	 speaking	 at	 all.	 They	 conclude	 that	 the	frequency	of	inner	speaking	displays	a	large	inter-individual	variability,	ranging	from	about	zero	to	nearly	100%,	with	a	mean	of	about	26%	of	sampled	moments	(Heavey	&	Hurlburt,	2008).	They	suggest	that	the	rest	of	our	inner	experience	consists	of	four	other	components:	inner	seeing,	feeling,	sensory	awareness	and	unsymbolised	thinking.	Inner	seeing	is	visually	imagining	something	that	is	not	present.	Feeling	corresponds	to	“affective	experiences,	such	as	sadness,	happiness,	humor,	anxiety,	 fear,	 joy,	nervousness,	anger,	embarrassment,	etc”.	Sensory	awareness	is	paying	attention	to	a	sensory	aspect	of	the	environment	(cold,	wind,	hunger).	 Unsymbolised	 thinking	 is	 “thinking	 a	 particular	 definite	 thought	 without	 the	awareness	 of	 that	 thought	 being	 conveyed	 in	words,	 images	 or	 any	 other	 symbols”.	 It	 is	argued	to	be	a	distinct	phenomenon,	not	a	precursor	to	any	other	phenomenon,	and	to	be	clearly	articulated	and	specific.	Even	if	this	classification	can	be	debated	and	if	some	authors	reject	the	existence	of	unsymbolised	thinking	(Carruthers,	2009),	it	has	been	acknowledged	that	non-verbal	thinking	may	exist.	Hurlburt’s	notion	of	unsymbolised	thinking	is	for	instance	reminiscent	of	Paivio’s	(1990)	Dual	Coding	Theory,	according	to	which	stimuli	can	be	coded	and	mentally	manipulated	in	a	verbal	or	visual	mode.		Hurlburt	 is	 not	 alone	 in	 defending	 that	 our	 inner	 space	 is	 not	 entirely	 filled	 with	language.	Other	 authors	have	 estimated	 that	 approximately	 one	 quarter	 of	 our	 conscious	waking	 life	 consists	 of	 inner	 language	 (e.g.	 Uttl,	 Morin,	 Faulds,	 Hall	 &	 Wilson,	 2012).	Furthermore,	 inner	 language,	 when	 it	 occurs,	 can	 be	 intertwined	 with	 non-linguistic	fragments.	 According	 to	 Wiley	 (2014),	 words	 can	 be	 combined	 with	 “sounds,	 numbers,	visuals,	colors,	tastes	and	odors,	tactile	feelings,	kinesthetics	and	emotions.”	These	elements	can	be	placed	into	syntactical	slots,	producing	inner	utterances	that	are	only	partially	verbal	(e.g.	the	words	“I’d	like”	followed	by	the	image	of	a	hamburger).	Our	inner	space	is	therefore	not	fully	occupied	by	language:	on	average,	approximately	a	quarter	of	our	inner	space	consists	of	inner	verbalisation,	the	rest	is	made	up	of	images,	emotions,	sensations	and	unsymbolised	elements.		
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2. Various	instances	of	inner	language	
2.1 Wilful	inner	language	vs	verbal	mind	wandering	Inner	 language	 manifests	 in	 various	 ways.	 We	 often	 deliberately	 engage	 in	 short	instances	of	inner	speech,	for	instance	when	we	count,	make	a	list,	or	schedule	our	weekly	objectives.	We	can	engage	 in	 longer	sophisticated	 inner	talk,	carried	out	 in	 full	sentences,	when	 we	 prepare	 a	 lecture,	 think	 hard	 about	 an	 argument,	 or	 imagine	 possible	 future	conversations.	These	short	and	long	instances	of	inner	language	can	be	referred	to	as	“wilful”	or	 “deliberate”	 inner	 language.	 But	 sometimes	 our	 internal	monologue	 is	 less	wilful,	 less	active	and	“more	passive”	(Bonald,	cited	 in	Egger,	1881).	The	more	passive	 form	of	 inner	language	was	seized	by	Plato	who	drew	a	distinction	between	opinion	and	fancy:	“[thought]	is	a	silent	inner	conversation	of	the	soul	with	itself.	[…]	when	this	arises	in	the	soul	silently	by	way	 of	 thought,	 can	 you	 give	 it	 any	 other	 name	 than	 opinion?	 […]	 And	when	 such	 a	condition	 is	 brought	 about	 in	 anyone,	 not	 independently,	 but	 through	 sensation,	 can	 it	properly	be	called	anything	but	seeming,	or	fancy?"	(Plato,	Sophist,	263e-264a).	This	fanciful	inner	language	has	been	referred	to	as	“verbal	mind	wandering”	(Perrone-Bertolotti	et	al.,	2014),	and	often	occurs	during	“resting	states”	(mind	wandering	can	also	take	a	non-verbal	form,	such	as	visual	imagery,	hence	the	adjective	“verbal”).	Verbal	mind	wandering	consists	of	 flowing,	 spontaneous,	 unconstrained,	 external-stimulus-independent	 verbal	 thoughts.	Mind	 wandering	 (MW)	 has	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 several	 recent	 neurocognitive	 studies.	Smallwood	 and	 Schooler	 (2015)	 have	 recognized	 several	 beneficial	 outcomes	 of	 mind	wandering	(see	also	Mooneyham	and	Schooler,	2013,	Schooler	et	al.,	2014,	Smallwood	and	Andrews-Hanna,	 2013).	 According	 to	 them,	 the	 first	 benefit	 of	 MW	 is	 prospection.	 The	thoughts	 that	occur	during	MW	are	often	 future-oriented,	helping	 to	 improve	daily	 life.	A	second	 beneficial	 outcome	 is	 creativity.	MW	 seems	 to	 be	 associated	with	 the	 capacity	 to	generate	novel,	creative	thoughts.	A	third	value	is	to	add	meaning	to	personal	experience.	By	engaging	in	mental	time	travel,	MW	enables	people	to	integrate	past	and	future	events	into	a	meaningful	 life	 narrative.	 Other	 beneficial	 outcomes	 include	 mental	 breaks	 to	 relieve	boredom	from	monotonous	activities,	and	day-dreaming	to	prepare	for	potential	obstacles	or	threats.	It	can	be	speculated	that	among	the	many	forms	of	VM,	the	verbal	one	(unwilful	inner	language)	is	the	most	likely	to	play	the	first	three	of	these	roles:	prospection,	creativity	
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and	meaning.	
2.2 Condensed	vs	expanded	inner	language	In	 addition	 to	 the	 various	 intentional	degrees	of	 inner	 language,	 various	 degrees	 of	unfolding	have	been	identified.	Some	variants	are	condensed	relative	to	other	fully	formed,	or	expanded,	versions	(e.g.	Fernyhough,	2004;	Alderson-Day	and	Fernyhough,	2015	or	Geva,	Jones,	Crinion,	Price,	Baron	&	Warburton,	2011b).	Condensation	seems	to	operate	at	different	levels:	articulation,	phonology,	lexicon	and	syntax.	 Introspective	accounts	of	condensation	are	 abundant.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 for	 instance	 that	 because	 inner	 language	 is	 directed	 to	oneself,	 it	 is	shortened	compared	to	overt	speech	addressed	to	an	external	 listener.	Egger	(1881,	p.	69-71)	was	the	first	to	clearly	list	physiological	and	social	constraints	for	why	inner	language	may	be	shorter.	First,	he	argued	that	we	cannot	overtly	articulate	as	quickly;	the	speed	of	our	tongue	movements	being	physiologically	limited	(“à	parler	trop	vite	la	langue	
s’embarrasse”3).	Moreover,	when	we	speak	aloud,	we	need	to	take	breath	between	fragments	of	speech,	as	speech	only	occurs	during	expiratory	phases.	Because	it	is	not	subjected	to	these	physiological	constraints,	inner	speech	is	accelerated	compared	with	overt	speech.	Secondly,	Egger	noted	social	constraints.	When	we	speak	to	someone,	we	need	to	articulate	clearly	and	slowly,	in	order	to	be	understood.	When	we	use	inner	speech,	this	social	constraint	can	be	abandoned	 and	 our	 articulation	 can	 be	more	 “sketchy”.	 Furthermore,	 according	 to	 Egger	(1881,	p.71),	some	expressions	that	we	use	mentally	bear	meanings	that	are	explicit	only	to	ourselves.	 In	 order	 for	 them	 to	 be	 understood,	 we	 would	 need	 to	 provide	 contextual	information	and	to	replace	these	expressions	by	a	detailed	and	explicit	discourse.		Therefore,	inner	speech	is	not	only	physically	shortened	with	respect	to	overt	speech,	it	 can	 also	 be	 syntactically	 condensed,	 or	 left	 elliptical.	 Vygotsky	 further	 developed	 this	notion	(Vygotsky,	1934/1986).	His	theory	is	based	on	introspection,	and	on	examination	of	children’s	private	speech	(or	egocentric	speech),	in	which	children	talk	to	themselves	aloud,	and	which	he	claimed	to	be	a	precursor	of	adult	inner	speech.	He	asserted	that	important	words	or	grammatical	affixes	may	be	dropped.	According	to	him,	the	syntax	of	inner	speech	is	“predicated,”	 in	 the	sense	that	only	necessary	 information	 is	supplied.	The	subject,	 and	
                                               3	“when	speaking	too	quickly	the	tongue	gets	tangled	up”	
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even	 the	 verb,	 might	 be	 omitted.	 Bergounioux	 follows	 this	 notion	 of	 abbreviation,	condensation	and	predication,	providing	detailed	linguistic	descriptions	of	the	phenomenon.	According	 to	 Bergounioux	 (2001,	 p.	 120),	 “l’endophasie	 ne	 semble	 différer	 de	 la	 parole	explicite	 ni	 par	 sa	 grammaire	 ni	 par	 son	 lexique,	 à	 la	 réserve	 d’un	 emploi	 généralisé	 de	l’asyndète	et	de	l’anaphore,	et	d’une	surreprésentation	de	la	prédicativité.”4		Examples	 of	 such	 linguistic	 operations	 can	 be	 found	 in	 literary	 or	 artistic	 works,	typically	those	associated	with	the	“monologue	intérieur”	(Dujardin,	1887,	1931)	or	“stream	of	 consciousness”	movement,	 initiated	 by	Dujardin	 (Smadja,	 in	 press).	 Although	Dujardin	depicted	 internal	 monologue	 as	 swarming	 with	 syntactically	 expanded	 sentences,	 later	renditions	–	such	as	Molly	Bloom’s	monologue	in	Joyce’s	Ulysses,	the	disjointed	monologue	in	Samuel	 Beckett’s	The	Unnamable	 or	 the	human	monologues	overheard	 by	 angels	 in	Wim	Wender’s	Wings	of	Desire	–	are	closer	to	the	introspective	descriptions	of	Egger,	Vygotsky	or	Bergounioux,	in	that	they	are	more	fragmentary,	abbreviated,	predicated	and	condensed,	at	both	the	syntactic	and	lexical	levels.	Empirical	 grounding	 for	 the	 condensed	 quality	 of	 inner	 speech	 at	 the	 syntactic	 and	lexical	 levels	 can	 be	 found	 in	 an	 astute	 study	 of	 the	 rate	 of	 spontaneous	 covert	 speech	production	(Korba,	1990).	Participants	were	asked	to	mentally	solve	a	series	of	short	verbal	problems.	They	reported	the	elliptical	inner	speech	used	to	solve	each	problem,	which	gave	an	 estimation	 of	 the	 number	 of	 words	 used	 in	 this	 type	 of	 mentation.	 They	 were	 then	instructed	 to	 expand	 the	 same	 volume	 of	 words	 into	 a	 full	 ostensive	 statement	 of	 their	internal	problem-solving	strategies,	which	provided	an	extended	word	count.	The	extended	word	count	represented	an	equivalent	rate	of	speech	in	excess	of	4000	words	per	minute,	which	 cannot	 possibly	 be	 reached	 in	 overt	 mode.	 These	 findings	 are	 in	 favour	 of	 the	introspective	claim	that	inner	verbalisation	is	condensed	with	respect	to	overt	public	speech,	at	least	at	the	syntactic	and	lexical	levels.	In	 line	 with	 Egger’s	 claim	 that	 inner	 speech	 is	 less	 articulated,	 it	 has	 further	 been	suggested	that	the	phonological	form	of	inner	words	may	itself	be	abbreviated.	Several	soviet	psychologists	suggested	that	inner	speech	is	phonologically	reduced,	with	many	phonemes	
                                               4	“endophasia	does	not	seem	to	differ	from	explicit	speech,	neither	by	its	grammar,	nor	its	lexicon,	except	perhaps	in	a	generalised	use	of	asyndeton,	anaphora	and	an	over-representation	of	predication”	
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being	dropped,	typically	vowels,	and	only	the	word-initial	sounds	being	clearly	produced	(e.g.	Vygotsky,	1934/1986,	p.	237,	244;	Anan’ev	cited	in	Sokolov,	1972,	p.	50).	This	claim	receives	support	from	studies	that	show	that	word	production	is	faster	in	inner	than	overt	mode,	even	when	 lexical	 content	 is	 controlled	 (Marshall	 and	 Cartwright,	 1978;	 Anderson,	 1982).	Marshall	 and	 Cartwright	 (1980)	 examined	 both	 word	 and	 sentence	 productions	 in	 a	recitation	task.	They	found	that	silent	recitation	was	faster	than	overt	recitation	for	lists	of	one-	and	three-syllable	words	as	well	as	lists	of	grammatical	and	ungrammatical	sentences.	MacKay	 (1981)	 also	 examined	 sentence	 production.	 Participants	were	 asked	 to	 produce	identical	sentences	as	rapidly	as	possible,	either	overtly	or	covertly.	Results	indicated	that	both	internal	and	overt	speech	improved	with	practice	and	that	overt	sentence	production	took	longer.	These	controlled	studies	imply	that	inner	speech	is	abbreviated	with	respect	to	overt	 speech,	 even	 at	 the	 phonological	 level,	 in	 line	with	 introspective	 views.	 This	 could	suggest	that	some	of	the	phonological	or	articulatory	processes	involved	in	overt	speech	are	absent	in	covert	mode.	An	alternative	interpretation,	described	in	Section	3.4,	is	that	inner	speech	 involves	the	same	operations	as	overt	speech	but	 that	 the	execution	of	articulator	movements	takes	longer	than	their	simulation.	Another	source	of	information	on	the	lower	levels	(phonological	and	articulatory)	of	covert	production	are	error	patterns.	As	explained	by	Oppenheim	and	Dell	(2008),	speech	errors	display	a	lexical	bias,	a	bias	towards	creating	words	(e.g.	REEF	LEECH	leading	to	LEAF	REACH)	rather	than	nonwords	(e.g.	WREATH	LEAGUE	leading	to	LEATH	REEG),	in	both	overt	and	covert	speech	modes.	This	bias	has	been	interpreted	by	these	authors	as	evidence	for	the	spreading-activation	model	 of	 Dell	 (1986),	 which	 posits	 an	 interactive	 flow	of	 activation	between	phonological	and	lexical	levels.	The	lexical	bias	suggests	that	inner	speech	activates	not	only	conceptual	but	also	lexical	as	well	as	phonological	representations.	A	second	bias	has	been	reported,	called	the	“phonemic	similarity	effect,”	a	tendency	to	exchange	phonemes	with	common	subphonemic	articulatory	features	(e.g.	REEF	slips	more	often	to	LEAF,	with	/r/	and	/l/	sharing	many	features	such	as	voicing	and	approximant,	than	REEF	to	BEEF,	with	/r/	and	/b/	only	sharing	voicing).	This	effect	is	explained	by	Oppenheim	and	 Dell	 with	 reference	 to	 reciprocal	 activations	 between	 articulatory	 and	 phonological	levels.	Oppenheim	and	Dell	(2008,	2010)	have	only	found	this	effect	in	overt	mode	or	with	
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inner	speech	accompanied	with	mouthing.	This	has	led	them	to	claim	that	inner	speech	is	fully	specified	at	the	lexical	and	phonological	levels,	but	that	it	is	impoverished	at	the	lower	subphonemic	(or	articulatory)	level.	As	we	will	see	in	Section	3.4,	there	are	several	empirical	arguments	against	this	claim,	however,	so	the	conclusion	on	the	articulatory	poverty	of	inner	speech	should	be	considered	with	caution.	To	summarise,	some	variants	of	inner	language	have	been	claimed	to	be	sketchy	and	impoverished	at	many	levels,	including	syntactic,	lexical,	phonological	and	articulatory.	This	abbreviation	bestows	 inner	language	an	abstract	quality	 that	has	 led	some	researchers	to	consider	 it	 as	 an	 amodal	 phenomenon.	 MacKay	 (1992)	 stated	 that	 inner	 speech	 is	nonarticulatory	and	nonauditory.	According	to	him,	articulatory	movements	“are	irrelevant	to	inner	speech.	Even	the	lowest	level	units	for	inner	speech	are	highly	abstract.”	For	MacKay,	“[t]he	seemingly	auditory	quality	of	our	internal	speech	cannot	be	automatically	attributed	to	events	within	an	auditory	or	acoustic	system,	or	even,	as	we	will	see,	to	any	strictly	sensory	system.”	 This	 strong	 stance	 is	 in	 line	 with	 Bergounioux’	 (2001)	 claim	 that	 “endophasia,	phenomenologically	speaking,	is	speech	without	a	signal”,	i.e.	without	a	“dépense	d'énergie	quantifiable	et	capturable”	(“quantifiable	and	capturable	energy	expenditure”).	This	would	implie	that	inner	language	is	divorced	from	bodily	experience	and	includes,	at	most,	faded	auditory	representations.	As	we	will	see	in	the	following	sections,	inner	language	is	not	always	condensed	and	some	 variants	 of	 inner	 language	 are	 in	 fact	 fully	 expanded.	 Neurocognitive	 data	 do	 not	corroborate	the	strong	claim	that	inner	language	is	impoverished	and	lacks	articulatory	or	auditory	specification	(see	3).	Some	instances	of	inner	language,	including	mental	sentence	repetition,	 instructed	mental	sentence	generation,	 silent	 reading,	 verbal	working	memory	are	dependent	on	perceptuo-motor	processes	and	their	operational	details.	These	instances	may	 be	 considered	 as	 embodied,	 involving	 physical	 processes	 that	 unfold	 over	 time	 and	leading	to	the	creation	of	articulatory	and	auditory	percepts.	They	presumably	integrate	a	variety	of	representations,	from	semantic	concepts	to	articulatory	features,	via	lexical	items	and	phonological	representations.	These	 seemingly	 opposite	 views	 on	 the	 condensed	 and	 expanded	 quality	 of	 inner	language	are	not	mutually	exclusive,	however.	Fernyhough	(2004)	has	suggested	that	inner	
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speech	 varies	 with	 cognitive	 and	 emotional	 conditions	 between	 these	 two	 forms.	 The	expanded	form	can	even	be	considered	as	an	outcome	of	the	condensed	form,	which	itself	can	be	construed	as	the	conceptual	message	cast	in	a	pre-verbal	form,	that	involves	lemmas5,	linearly	 ordered,	 but	 that	 does	 not	 yet	 have	 the	 full	 phonological	 (articulatory,	 acoustic)	specification	that	expanded	inner	language	has	(see	e.g.	Levelt,	1989).	A	similar	position	is	defended	in	Vicente	&	Martínez-Manrique	(2016).	Inner	language	can	be	defined	as	truncated	overt	verbalisation,	but	 the	 level	at	which	the	production	process	 is	 interrupted	(abstract	linguistic	 representation	vs.	 articulatory	 specification)	depends	on	which	variant	of	 inner	language	is	at	play.	The	less	wilful	variants	of	inner	language,	such	as	verbal	mind	wandering,	might	take	on	a	more	condensed	format,	whereas	wilful	forms	might	be	more	expanded.	Interestingly,	 the	 variant	 of	 inner	 language	 that	 is	 most	 studied	 in	 experimental	psychology	 and	 cognitive	 neuroscience	 is	 the	wilful	 form,	 because	 it	 can	 be	 examined	 in	controlled	settings,	in	a	replicable	fashion.	But	the	variant	that	has	been	the	focus	of	most	introspective	 works	 by	 literary	 scholars,	 philosophers,	 artists,	 is	 unbidden	 interior	monologue,	a	subset	of	verbal	mind	wandering	(which	also	includes	interior	conversations).	This	variant	is	the	most	difficult	to	examine	experimentally,	as	it	is	spontaneous.	This	could	explain	why	 introspective	 and	 empirical	 accounts	 sometimes	 differ.	 A	 few	 neuroimaging	studies	have	endeavoured	to	compare	wilful	and	spontaneous	inner	language,	but	they	are	far	too	rare	for	any	conclusion	to	be	drawn	(Hurlburt,	Alderson-Day,	Kühn	&	Fernyhough,	2016;	Grandchamp	and	colleagues,	in	preparation).	
2.3 Inner	language	during	reading	Another	variant	of	inner	language	is	the	silent	vocalisation	that	accompanies	reading.	According	to	Egger	(1881),	inner	speech	is	in	fact	easiest	to	notice	when	one	reads.	Egger	(1881)	 and	 Ballet	 (1886)	 suggested	 that	 during	 reading,	 one	 does	 not	 only	 mentally	articulate	 the	 words	 that	 are	 read,	 but	 one	 can	 experience	 hearing	 them	 too.	 Several	experimental	psychology	studies	have	examined	this	claim	and	have	shown	that	reading	does	involve	an	 inner	voice.	 It	has	been	shown	for	 instance	that	silent	reading	 is	 influenced	by	
                                               
5 The term lemma in Levelt and colleagues’ terminology refers to the word’s syntax, see Levelt et al. (1999). It is different 
from the lexeme which denotes the word’s phonological features and from the lexical concept which refers to the word’s 
semantics. 
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pronunciation	characteristics.	Alexander	&	Nygaard	(2008)	have	shown	that	silent	reading	of	a	text	is	influenced	by	the	knowledge	we	have	of	its	author’s	speaking	rate.	Participants	take	longer	to	silently	read	a	text	when	they	are	told	that	it	was	written	by	a	slow	talker	rather	than	a	 fast	 talker.	Silent	reading	 is	also	modulated	by	the	reader’s	regional	accent.	Filik	&	Barber	(2011)	compared	the	eye	movements	of	English	participants	with	different	regional	accents	who	were	 reading	 limericks.	 Limericks	 are	 short	 poems	 in	which	 the	 final	 word	rhymes	with	the	end	words	of	the	first	two	lines.	The	authors	created	limericks	in	which	the	final	word	would	rhyme	or	not,	depending	on	the	regional	accent.	When	the	final	word	did	not	rhyme	in	the	reader’s	accent,	a	disruption	in	the	eye	movement	record	was	observed,	compared	to	when	it	rhymed.	This	finding	suggest	that	silent	reading	includes	properties	of	the	reader’s	own	pronunciation	habits.	The	occurrence	of	inner	speech	during	silent	reading	has	also	been	confirmed	by	recent	intracranial	 electroencephalography	 recordings.	 Perrone-Bertolotti	 and	 her	 colleagues	(2012)	measured	activity	in	the	temporal	voice	area	(TVA)	of	epileptic	patients.	This	region	in	 auditory	 cortex	 is	 selectively	 activated	 during	 human	 voice	 perception	 (Belin,	 Zatorre,	Lafaille,	Ahad,	&	Pike,	2000).	The	patients	were	instructed	to	silently	read	words.	The	results	show	 that	silent	reading	activates	 the	TVA.	Moreover,	TVA	activity	was	 found	 to	strongly	increase	when	participants	were	reading	attentively.	This	suggest	that	the	inner	voice	heard	during	silent	reading	is	not	an	automatic	process,	which	would	be	triggered	in	response	to	any	written	word,	but	that	it	is	modulated	by	attention.	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	silent	reading	is	not	systematically	associated	with	inner	speech	production,	even	when	attention	is	high.	Levine,	Calvanio	&	Popovics	(1982)	have	reported	the	case	of	a	patient,	who	as	a	result	of	a	stroke,	became	mute	and	was	unable	to	speak	covertly.	He	could	not	tell	whether	two	words	rhymed,	which	suggests	he	could	not	evoke	the	auditory	representations	associated	with	words.	Yet	his	reading	abilities	remained	intact.	His	visual	imagery	was	strongly	developed	(he	could	make	highly	accurate	drawings	from	memory).	This	case	report	therefore	suggests	that	when	visual	imagery	is	proficient,	then	reading	processes	may	sometimes	bypass	phonological	mediation	(covert	pronouncing	and	inner	voice	hearing),	directly	linking	the	word’s	written	form	to	its	semantic	content.		
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2.4 Inner	language	during	writing	Writing	 is	 generally	 considered	 to	 involve	 an	 inner	 voice.	 In	 the	 film	Paterson,	 Jim	Jarmusch	 lets	us	 follow	Paterson,	 a	 bus	 driver	who	writes	 poetry.	 The	 film	 suggests	 that	Paterson	elaborates	his	poems	mentally	before	writing	them	down.	We	can	hear	his	inner	voice	as	he	composes	each	poem,	and	then	as	he	writes	the	lines	in	his	notebook.	Studies	in	experimental	psychology	have	shown	that	writing	involves	many	processes,	including	idea	generation,	 concept	 and	 word	 retrieval	 from	 semantic	 and	 lexical	 memory,	 syntactic	processing	 and	 access	 to	 graphemic	 forms	 (letters	 in	 the	 words).	 A	 debated	 question	 is	whether	the	transformation	from	lexical	to	graphemic	forms	recruits	inner	speech.	According	to	 the	 “phonological	mediation	 hypothesis,”	 spoken	 forms	 of	words	 are	 retrieved	 before	graphemic	forms	can	be	accessed.	This	hypothesis	is	supported	by	studies	of	brain-lesioned	patients,	which	show	that	deficits	 in	spoken	 language	are	associated	with	 impairments	 in	written	language	production	(e.g.	Luria,	1966).		An	alternative	view	is	 that	orthographic	 forms	can	be	accessed	from	abstract	 lexical	knowledge	 without	 phonological	 mediation.	 A	 few	 brain-lesioned	 patient	 studies	 have	reported	dissociations	between	writing	and	speaking	impairments.	The	patient	in	the	study	by	Levine	et	al.	(1982)	discussed	above	was	deprived	of	inner	speech	but	could	still	read	and	write.	Rapp	et	al.	(1997)	presented	the	case	of	a	stroke	patient	who	suffered	from	speech	deficits.	He	was	often	unable	to	provide	the	correct	spoken	name	of	an	object,	although	he	could	 write	 it.	 These	 cases	 therefore	 seem	 to	 argue	 against	 the	 phonological	 mediation	hypothesis,	in	that	writing	can	be	achieved	without	spoken	language	mediation,	when	word	production	is	impaired,	due	to	a	stroke.	It	cannot	be	ruled	out,	however,	that	the	seemingly	direct	 link	between	grapheme	and	meaning,	was	 initially	(before	the	stroke)	mediated	by	covert	speech	and	that	the	direct	connection	was	gradually	learned.	The	recent	study	of	a	child	with	congenital	oral	apraxia	is	more	compelling	(Cossu,	2003).	Despite	his	inability	to	produce	any	articulation,	this	child	had	normal	reading	and	writing	skills.	He	presumably	did	not	rely	on	a	covert	version	of	his	own	articulation	to	read	and	write.	Therefore,	articulatory	mediation	 is	 not	 always	 necessary	 during	 writing.	 Nevertheless,	 since	 this	 child	 had	preserved	auditory	capacities,	we	could	argue	that	writing	is	still	associated	with	auditory	representations,	and	that	the	lexicon-grapheme	transformation	may	well	rely	on	auditory-phonological	 representations.	 Therefore,	 this	 study	 does	 not	 fully	 contradict	 the	
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phonological	mediation	hypothesis,	even	though	it	makes	it	weaker.	The	representations	at	play	in	this	child	are	auditory	at	best,	and	not	articulatory.	
2.5 Contained	vs	ruminative	inner	language	Inner	speech	plays	a	central	role	in	human	consciousness	at	the	interplay	of	language	and	thought	(Morin,	2005)	and	is	beneficial	to	many	cognitive	operations.	It	interacts	with	working	 memory	 to	 encode	 new	 material	 (Baddeley	 &	 Hitch,	 1974).	 It	 is	 involved	 in	remembering	personal	past	episodes,	including	conversations,	situations	and	emotions,	i.e.	it	plays	a	role	in	autobiographical	memories	(Morin,	2012).	It	is	used	in	future	planning,	in	reasoning,	 in	 problem	 solving	 (Sokolov,	 1972;	 Baldo	 et	 al.,	 2015),	 in	 cognitive	 control,	executive	 function,	 cognitive	 flexibility	 (Emerson	&	Miyake,	2003),	 in	 consciousness,	 self-awareness,	 self-regulation,	 self-motivation	 (Morin,	 2009),	 in	 self-encouraging	 and	 self-comforting	(Pavlenko,	2014).		Inner	 language	 can	 sometimes	 play	 a	 detrimental	 role,	 however,	 when	 it	 becomes	repetitive	 and	 negative.	 Dostoyevsky’s	 Crime	 and	 Punishment	 provides	 illustrative	descriptions	of	how	ruminative	forms	of	inner	language	may	become	intrusive,	such	as	when	the	 ex-student	 and	 future	 murderer	 Raskolnikov,	 sitting	 in	 a	 tavern,	 reflects	 upon	 the	mysteries	of	chance	and	destiny:	"A	strange	idea	was	pecking	at	his	brain	like	a	chicken	in	the	egg,	and	very,	very	much	absorbed	him"	(part	1,	chapter	6).	Self-reflection,	pondering	about	ourselves,	our	feelings,	thoughts	and	behaviours,	can	contribute	 to	 clarifying	 the	 meaning	 of	 past	 and	 present	 experiences	 (Nolen-Hoeksema,	Wisco,	&	Lyubomirsky,	2008).	However,	 it	can	 lead	to	unconstructive	consequences	when	self-referent	thoughts	transform	into	verbal	rumination,	i.e.	repetitive	and	self-critical	inner	speech	(Watkins,	2008;	Nalborczyk	et	al.,	2017).	It	has	been	shown	that	rumination	alters	cognitive	 performance	 in	 depressed	 or	 dysphoric	 patients	 and	 that	 it	 can	 predict	 and	exacerbate	 the	maintenance	of	dysphoric	or	depressive	 states	 (Davis	&	Nolen-Hoeksema,	2000).		It	 still	 remains	 to	 be	 understood	 why	 excessive,	 negative	 inner	 speech	 impairs	performance	 whereas	 more	 contained	 and	 positive	 inner	 speech	 improves	 cognitive	performance.		
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2.6 Self-controlled	vs	hallucinatory	forms	Another	 dysfunctional	 case	 of	 inner	 language	are	 auditory	 verbal	 hallucinations.	 As	argued	 by	 Fernyhough	 (1996,	 2004)	 and	 Alderson-Day	 and	 colleagues	 (2016),	 inner	language	is	often	dialogic,	mirroring	the	external	experience	of	communication.	We	can	have	imaginary	conversations	and	we	can	then	hear	the	others’	voices,	their	timbre,	their	pitch.	When	we	do	so,	we	usually	know	that	these	voices	are	self-generated	and	we	do	not	mistake	these	 imaginary	 voices	 for	 external	 voices.	 This	 is	 because	we	 are	 endowed	with	 a	 self-monitoring	 mechanism.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 when	 this	 mechanism	 is	 defective,	auditory	verbal	hallucination	may	occur.	Auditory	verbal	hallucination	(AVH)	or	“hearing	voices”	can	be	considered	as	speech	perceptions	in	the	absence	of	any	relevant	external	acoustic	input.	It	affects	50-80%	of	the	patients	who	 suffer	 from	 schizophrenia	 (Nayani	 &	 David,	 1996).	 Patients	 report	 hearing	voices,	which	are	often	distressing	and	engender	suffering	and	functional	disability	as	well	as	 social	 marginalisation	 (Franck,	 2006).	 Auditory	 verbal	 hallucination	 is,	 however,	 a	complex	phenomenon	with	multiple	 forms	and	causes	 (Larøi	&	Woodward,	2007).	 It	 also	occurs	 in	 non-psychiatric	 populations,	 and	 it	 is	 estimated	 that	 4-10	 %	 of	 the	 healthy	population	experience	it	(Linden	et	al.,	2011).		Many	theoretical	models	have	been	proposed	to	explain	AVHs	in	schizophrenia	(see,	David,	 2004,	 for	 a	 review).	 An	 influential	model	 formulates	 AVHs	 as	 dysfunctions	 of	 the	monitoring	of	 inner	speech	(Feinberg,	1978;	Frith,	1992).	The	model	claims	that	due	to	a	failure	of	the	self-monitoring	mechanism,	the	inner	speech	of	the	patient	is	not	identified	as	self-generated	and	is	experienced	as	coming	from	an	external	source.		However,	voice	hearers	(patients	with	schizophrenia	as	well	as	healthy	individuals)	can	also	use	 inner	 language	deliberately,	without	experiencing	voices.	 Inner	 language	 in	voice	hearers	 is	 not	 always	 dysfunctional.	 Some	 researchers	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 distinction	between	AVH	and	inner	speech	in	non-clinical	hallucinators.	Linden	and	colleagues	(2011)	have	argued	that	the	distinction	is	related	to	subjective	control:	AVH	occurs	spontaneously,	while	wilful	inner	speech	occurs	under	volitional	control.	This	claim	is	in	line	with	studies	by	Rapin	et	al.	(2012)	and	Lavigne	et	al.	(2015)	who	suggest	that	the	supervisory	processes	that	are	at	play	during	willful	inner	speech	can	serve	to	normalise	the	activity	in	sensory	cortex.	
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The	absence	of	such	processes	could	explain	why	hyperactivity	in	sensory	cortex	is	observed	in	hallucinatory	experience.	It	can	therefore	be	speculated	that	wilful	inner	speech	engages	supervisory	 control	 that	modulates	sensory	activity,	whereas	more	 spontaneous	 forms	of	inner	 language,	deprived	of	supervisory	and	self-monitoring	processes,	may	end	up	being	attributed	to	external	sources.	
3. Various	formats	of	inner	language	
3.1 Auditory	sensations	Early	introspective	works	(Egger,	1881,	Ballet,	1886)	have	claimed	that	inner	speech	is	endowed	 with	 auditory	 qualities.	 Egger	 (1881)	 wrote	 that	 “[l]a	 parole	 intérieure	 a	l’apparence	 d’un	 son”6	 and	 that	 “[l]es	 caractères	 de	 la	 parole	 [rythme,	 hauteur,	 intensité,	timbre]	[…]	se	retrouvent	tous	dans	la	parole	intérieure”7.	The	 concept	 of	 a	 mind’s	 ear	 finds	 support	 in	 psycholinguistic	 data.	 The	 "Verbal	Transformation	Effect"	(VTE)	refers	to	the	perceptual	phenomenon	in	which	listeners	report	hearing	 a	 new	percept	when	 an	 ambiguous	 stimulus	 is	 repeated	 rapidly	 (Warren,	 1961).	Rapid	repetitions	of	 the	word	“life”,	 for	example,	produce	a	soundstream	fully	compatible	with	segmentations	into	“life”	or	“fly”.	Smith,	Wilson,	and	Reisberg	(1995)	further	examined	the	VTE,	and	found	that	it	also	occurs	in	a	covert	mode.	In	addition,	they	observed	a	reduction	of	 the	effect	during	auditory	 interference.	These	 findings	suggest	 that	subjects	rely	on	the	mind’s	ear	to	detect	transformations.	The	neural	correlates	of	the	VTE	have	been	examined	by	 Sato	 and	 colleagues	 (2004).	 Participants	were	 asked	 to	 silently	 repeat	 pseudo-words.	Active	search	for	verbal	transformation	increased	activity	in	several	brain	regions,	including	auditory	cortex.		Findings	of	error	detection	during	covert	tongue-twister	repetition	also	indicate	that	inner	 speech	 has	 auditory	 qualities	 that	 can	 be	 attended	 to.	 Several	 studies	 (see	 Dell	 &	Oppenheim,	 2015	 for	 a	 review)	 have	 investigated	 error	 slips	 reports.	 They	 show	 that	participants	are	able	to	attend	to	and	report	the	“errors	that	they	hear,”	like	they	do	with	slips	produced	 in	audible	 speech.	This	 can	be	 interpreted	as	a	 role	 for	 the	mind’s	 ear	 in	 inner	
                                               6	“Inner	speech	has	the	appearance	of	a	sound.”	7		“The	characteristics	of	speech	[rhythm,	pitch,	intensity,	timbre]	(…)	are	all	found	in	inner	speech.	”	
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speech	monitoring.		Further	 empirical	 arguments	 for	 the	 auditory	 nature	 of	 inner	 speech	 come	 from	neuroimaging	 studies.	 Several	 fMRI	 (functional	 Magnetic	 Resonance	 Imaging)	 studies	 of	covert	 speech	 production	 reveal	 auditory	 cortex,	 specifically	 superior	 temporal	 gyrus,	activation	(Perrone-Bertolotti	et	al.,	2014	for	a	review).	Although	this	activation	is	lesser	than	the	one	observed	in	overt	speech,	it	implies	that	an	auditory	experience	accompanies	inner	speech.	 In	 that	 line,	 an	 fMRI	 study	 by	 Lœvenbruck,	 Baciu,	 Segebarth	 and	 Abry	 (2005)	suggested	 that	 covertly	 produced	 speech	 can	 include	 prosodic	 characteristics,	 with	distinctive	auditory	features	that	correspond	to	objectively	measurable	cerebral	correlates.	To	sum	up,	behavioural	and	neuroimaging	data	suggest	that	auditory	sensations	are	present	during	several	variants	of	inner	language.		
3.2 Somatosensory	sensations	The	phenomenological	intuition	that	inner	language	involves	a	voice	that	can	be	heard	in	the	mind’s	ear	is	not	controversial	and	meets	with	empirical	findings.	But	other	sensory	qualities	may	be	attributed	to	inner	language,	typically	imaginary	proprioceptive	and	tactile	sensations.	Taine	(1870)	himself	was	a	precursor	of	that	idea	when	he	wrote:	“A	l'état	normal	nous	pensons	tout	bas	par	des	mots	mentalement	entendus,	ou	lus,	ou	prononcés,	et	ce	qui	est	en	nous	c'est	l'image	de	tels	sons,	de	telles	lettres,	ou	de	telles	sensations	musculaires	et	
tactiles	du	gosier,	de	la	langue	et	des	lèvres.	(je	souligne)”8.	Paulhan	(1886)	wrote	that	lengthy	verbal	 thinking	can	cause	 fatigue	 in	articulatory	muscles,	which	 implies	 that	 inner	speech	involves	somatosensory	sensations.	According	to	Lackner	and	Tuller	(1979),	overt	speech	errors	 can	 be	 detected	 by	 means	 of	 proprioceptive	 information	 on	 articulatory	configurations	 as	well	 as	 tactile	 information	 about	 labial	 or	 lingual	 contacts.	 It	 has	 been	suggested	 that	 proprioceptive	 and	 tactile	 feedback	 play	 a	 role	 in	 speech	 motor	 control	(Levelt,	1989;	Postma,	2000).	 It	can	therefore	be	speculated	that	 imagined	proprioceptive	and	tactile	feedback	could	be	part	of	inner	speech,	just	as	imagined	voice	is.	In	addition	to	the	mind’s	ear,	the	“mind’s	touch"	should	also	be	considered.	Neuroimaging	studies	corroborate	
                                               8	In	the	normal	state,	we	silently	think	with	words	that	are	mentally	heard,	read	or	uttered,	and	what	is	inside	of	us	is	the	image	of	certain	sounds,	of	certain	letters,	or	of	certain	muscular	and	tactile	sensations	
in	the	throat,	tongue	and	lips.	(emphasis	is	mine)	
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this	assumption.	Several	studies	reviewed	by	Perrone-Bertolotti	and	colleagues	(2014)	show	somatosensory	cortex	activation	during	tasks	that	involve	inner	speech.	
3.3 Visual	images	Introspection	suggest	that	the	"mind’s	eye"	also	plays	a	role	in	inner	language.	Paulhan	(1886)	claimed	that	inner	speech	may	sometimes	include	visual	images.	By	visual	images	he	meant	the	form,	shape	and	colour	of	the	letters	that	compose	written	words.	But	other	visual	elements	may	also	be	included.		Recent	works	on	 inner	 verbalisation	 in	deaf	 individuals	 suggest	 that	 it	may	 contain	visual	elements	related	to	articulation	or	sign.	Bellugi,	Klima,	and	Siple	(1975)	compared	the	properties	of	short	term	memory	in	normal	hearing	participants	and	deaf	participants	whose	native	 language	was	American	Sign	Language	(ASL).	Lists	of	words	were	presented	to	the	deaf	 participants	 in	 the	 visual	 modality	 as	 signs	 on	 a	 videotape.	 The	 same	 words	 were	presented	in	the	auditory	modality	on	an	audiotape	to	the	hearing	controls.	The	task	was	to	recall	the	signed	or	spoken	words	and	to	write	them	in	English	orthography.	The	errors	made	by	 hearing	 subjects	 were	 mainly	 sound-based	 (e.g.	 “vote"	 misrecalled	 as	 “boat”).	 This	suggests	that	hearing	subjects	had	been	encoding	and	remembering	the	words	in	terms	of	their	phonological	properties.	In	signing	subjects,	many	substitution	errors	coincided	with	words	 that	were	 visually	 (not	 auditorily)	 close	 to	 the	 target,	 such	 as	 "noon”	 replaced	 by	“tree,”	 which	 corresponds	 to	 a	 similar	 arm	 position	 in	 ASL.	 Other	 behavioural	 studies	 of	verbal	working	memory	in	deaf	signers	similarly	reflect	a	transfer	from	the	auditory	to	the	visual	modality.	Wilson	and	Emmorey	(1998)	observed	a	sign	length	effect	in	deaf	users	of	ASL,	 analogous	 to	 the	 auditory	 word	 length	 effect	 in	 spoken	 language.	 Poorer	 memory	performance	was	found	for	long	signs	compared	to	short	signs,	independently	of	the	auditory	word	length.	Manual	suppression	(repetitive	movements	of	the	hands)	produced	a	drop	in	performance,	 just	 like	 articulatory	 suppression	 (repetitive	 syllable	 production)	 disrupts	verbal	working	memory	 in	 hearing	 subjects.	 These	 studies	 suggest	 that	 sign	 language	 is	stored	 in	 memory	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 gestural	 properties.	 Therefore,	 inner	 language	 in	 deaf	signers	presumably	involves	visual	representations.		Gestures	are	not	only	used	in	the	deaf	population.	They	accompany	speech	in	normal	
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hearers	and	play	a	fundamental	role	in	thought	and	speech	(De	Ruiter,	2007).	Gesture	and	speech	 are	 coordinated	 to	 form	 coherent	 multimodal	 messages.	 Moreover,	 speech	 is	audiovisual:	 lip	 reading	 enhances	 speech	 comprehension	 when	 the	 acoustic	 signal	 is	degraded	 by	 noise	 (Sumby	&	 Pollack,	 1954).	 Lip	 reading	 occurs	 even	with	 nondegraded	acoustic	signals,	such	as	in	the	McGurk	effect	(McGurk	&	MacDonald,	1976).	This	illusionary	effect	occurs	when	an	auditory	syllable	(such	as	/ba/)	is	synchronously	presented	with	the	video	of	a	face	uttering	a	discrepant	visual	syllable	(such	as	/ga/).	Most	participants	report	hearing	a	syllable	corresponding	to	the	fusion	of	the	auditory	and	visual	channels	(/da/	or	/ða/).	Based	on	this	audiovisual	integration	effect	and	other	studies,	it	has	been	argued	that	auditory	 and	 visual	 speech	 information	 include	 common	 stages	 of	 processing	 (Nahorna,	Berthommier,	&	Schwartz,	2015).	It	can	therefore	be	assumed	that	visual	information	(facial	and	manual)	may	be	involved	in	inner	speech,	even	in	hearing	subjects.	A	preliminary	work	by	Arnaud,	Schwartz,	Lœvenbruck,	and	Savariaux	(2008)	provides	tentative	suggestions	that	speakers	 can	 have	 visual	 representations	 of	 their	 own	 lip	movements.	 More	 research	 is	needed	 to	 confirm	 that	 inner	 language	 involves	 visual	 (labial,	 facial,	 manual,	 written)	representations,	even	in	the	hearing	population.	To	 sum	up,	 inner	verbalising	appears	 to	 involve	 the	 reception	of	 imaginary	 sensory	signals,	including	auditory,	somatosensory	and	visual	elements,	handled	by	the	mind’s	ear,	touch	and	eye.	The	format	of	inner	language	can	therefore	be	described	as	multisensory.	
3.4 Motor	representation	In	parallel	with	the	sensory	accounts,	it	has	been	suggested	that	inner	speech	requires	motor	processes.	The	earliest	claims	concerning	the	motor	quality	of	inner	speech	probably	date	 back	 to	 Erdmann	 (1851)	 and	 Geiger	 (1868),	 who,	 as	 cited	 by	 Stricker	 (1885),	introspectively	 observed	 that	 inner	 speech	 is	 accompanied	 by	 feelings	 of	 tension	 in	 the	speech	musculature.	Bain	himself	wrote	in	1855:	“When	we	recall	the	impression	of	a	word	or	a	sentence,	if	we	do	not	speak	it	out,	we	feel	the	twitter	of	the	organs	just	about	to	come	to	that	point.	The	articulating	parts,	—	the	larynx,	the	tongue,	the	lips,	—	are	all	sensibly	excited;	a	suppressed	articulation	is	in	fact	the	material	of	our	recollection.”	Stricker	(1885,	chapter	II)	designed	a	clever	introspective	exercise	to	experience	this	
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orofacial	 activity.	He	hinted	 that,	when	one’s	mouth	 is	positioned	 into	 the	rounded	shape	required	to	pronounce	the	sound	of	an	"o,"	if	one	tries	to	imagine	uttering	that	of	an	"m,"	a	slight	contraction	is	felt	in	the	lip	muscles,	as	if	one	was	pressing	lips	to	pronounce	the	labial	sound.	 Stricker	 (1885)	 claimed	 from	 several	 introspective	 exercises	 that	 inner	 speech	 is	accompanied	 by	 sensations	 in	 the	 oral	 musculature	 similar	 to	 those	 driving	 the	 actual	pronunciation	 of	 articulated	 sounds.	 He	 introduced	 the	 notion	 of	 motor	 representations	associated	 with	 inner	 speech	 and	 speculated	 that	 word	 representations	 consist	 in	 the	awareness	of	impulsions	driven	from	cerebral	speech	centres	to	speech	muscles.	In	 the	 same	 vein,	 Watson	 (1919)	 described	 inner	 speech	 (which	 he	 referred	 to	 as	“implicit	 language”)	 as	 a	 weakened	 form	 of	 overt	 speech.	 He	 explicitly	 considered	 inner	speech	 (which	he	equated	with	 thought)	as	a	 “highly	 integrated	bodily	activity"	 (Watson,	1919,	 325).	 According	 to	 him,	 inner	 speech	 involves	 “abbreviated,	 short-circuited	 and	economised	processes”	(323),	but	it	is	not	clear	whether	he	actually	postulated	that	inner	speech	 systematically	 involves	overt	movement,	or	 rather	motor	programs,	 i.e.	 simulated	actions.	The	extreme	view	that	inner	speech	requires	actual	movement	has	been	refuted	by	Smith	and	colleagues	 (1947).	Curare	was	administered	 to	a	healthy	volunteer,	 inducing	a	temporary	skeletal	muscular	paralysis.	Although	the	volunteer	became	incapable	of	mouth	movement	and	of	overt	speech,	he	was	still	aware	of	 the	questions	asked	and	was	able	 to	correctly	 report	 them	 after	 recovery.	 This	 experiment	 suggests	 that	 some	 form	 of	 inner	speech	 must	 have	 been	 present	 during	 muscular	 paralysis.	 Therefore,	 verbal	 thinking,	memory	 storage	 and	 presumably	 inner	 speech	 can	 take	 place	 even	 when	 articulation	 is	completely	prevented.	Thus,	the	extreme	version	of	Watson’s	view	cannot	be	upheld.	A	more	nuanced	view,	referred	to	as	the	Motor	Simulation	hypothesis,	is	that	inner	speech	is	a	mental	simulation	of	articulation,	without	actual	movement.	As	such,	 it	may	feature	physiological	correlates	 with	 recordable	 physical	 signals.	 In	 this	 physicalist	 or	 embodied	 view,	 inner	speech	production	is	described	as	similar	to	overt	speech	production,	except	that	the	motor	execution	process	is	blocked	and	no	sound	is	produced	(Grèzes	&	Decety,	2001;	Postma	&	Noordanus,	 1996).	 Under	 the	 Motor	 Simulation	 hypothesis,	 a	 continuum	 exists	 between	overt	and	covert	speech,	 in	 line	with	the	continuum	between	 imagined	and	actual	actions	proposed	by	Decety	and	Jeannerod	(1996).	This	hypothesis	has	led	some	authors	to	claim	that	 inner	 speech	by	essence	 should	share	 features	with	 speech	motor	actions	 (Feinberg,	
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1978;	 Jones	 &	 Fernyhough,	 2007).	 The	 Motor	 Simulation	 hypothesis	 is	 supported	 by	empirical	 findings,	 including	 physiological	 measurements,	 neural	 evidence	 and	psycholinguistic	data.	
Physiological	and	neural	evidence	Objective	 measurements	 of	 respiratory	 rate,	 speaking	 rate,	 muscular	 activity	 and	cerebral	patterns	all	suggest	that	inner	speech	involves	motor	processes.		As	 concerns	 respiratory	 rate,	 Conrad	 and	 Schönle	 (1979)	 have	 shown	 that	 the	respiratory	 cycle	 varies	 along	 a	 continuum,	 from	 rest	 to	 overt	 speech,	 via	 inner	 speech.	During	 rest,	 the	 breathing	 cycle	 is	 symmetrical,	 with	 inspiration	 and	 expiration	 phases	displaying	similar	durations.	In	overt	speech,	the	cycle	is	strongly	asymmetrical	with	a	short	inspiration	 and	 a	 long	 expiration	 during	 which	 speech	 is	 emitted.	 Inner	 speech	 is	 also	characterised	by	a	prolonged	expiratory	phase.	They	concluded	that	this	modification	of	the	respiratory	cycle	from	rest	to	inner	speech	suggests	that	motor	processes	are	at	play	during	inner	speech	(see	Chapell,	1994,	for	similar	findings).	Speaking	rate	findings	are	more	debated.	As	mentioned	in	Section	2.2,	silent	recitation	has	been	 found	 to	be	 faster	 than	overt	 recitation	by	many	 researchers.	 (Anderson,	1982;	Korba,	1990;	MacKay,	1981;	Marshall	and	Cartwright,	1978,	1980).	Some	studies	of	 inner	speech	 rate	have	 found	similar	 results	 for	 recitation	 in	 covert	 and	overt	modes,	however	(Landauer,	1962;	Weber	&	Bach,	1969;	Weber	&	Castleman,	1970).	This	would	suggest	that	inner	and	aloud	speech	may	involve	common	central	processes,	at	least	during	recitation	of	stored	words,	sentences	or	discourses	(alphabet,	numbers,	pledges).	Netsell	and	colleagues	have	 examined	more	 spontaneous	 sentence	 production	 in	 both	 covert	 and	 overt	 modes	(Netsell,	Kleinsasser,	&	Daniel,	2016).	Participants	generated	full	sentences	by	saying	the	first	thing	 that	 came	 to	 their	 mind.	 Spontaneous	 sentence	 generation	 involves	 conceptual	preparation	 and	 formulation	 (including	 morphological,	 phonological,	 and	 phonetic	encoding)	before	articulation	can	take	place	(e.g.	Levelt,	1989).	In	inner	speech,	articulation	is	inhibited,	but	conceptual	preparation	and	formulation	involve	processes	that	unfold	over	time.	Using	spontaneous	sentence	generation,	Netsell	and	colleagues	found	that	the	rate	of	inner	speech	(5.8	syllables	per	second)	was	significantly	faster	(5.2	syllables	per	second)	than	that	of	overt	speech.	But	the	fact	that	the	difference	is	relatively	small	implies	that	speaking	
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aloud	may	only	differ	from	inner	speech	by	the	additional	time	needed	to	overtly	articulate,	once	the	speech	motor	plan	is	fully	designed.	As	advocated	by	Netsell	and	colleagues,	more	research	 is	needed	 to	provide	precise	measures	of	 speaking	 rate	during	 covert	 and	overt	speech,	and	to	allow	for	informative	conclusions	on	the	time	course	of	the	two	processes.	Concerning	muscular	activity,	Stricker’s	introspective	observation	that	inner	speech	is	accompanied	with	muscular	contraction	finds	support	from	a	few	electromyographic	(EMG)	studies	 during	 controlled	 tasks	 involving	 inner	 speech.	 Using	 electrodes	 inserted	 in	 the	tongue	tip	or	 lips	of	participants,	 Jacobson	(1931)	was	able	 to	detect	EMG	activity	during	several	inner	speech	tasks.	Sokolov	(1972)	carried	out	surface	EMG	measurements	of	lip	and	tongue	 muscles.	 He	 recorded	 more	 intense	 muscle	 activation	 when	 participants	 had	 to	perform	 complex	 tasks,	 such	 as	 problem	 solving,	 which,	 according	 to	 him,	 necessitated	substantial	inner	speech	production.	Surface	EMG	recordings	carried	out	by	McGuigan	and	Dollins	(1989)	indicated	that	the	lips	were	significantly	active	when	silently	reading	the	letter	“P”	 (bilabial	 articulation),	 but	 not	when	 reading	 the	 letter	 “T”	 (alveolar	 articulation)	 or	 a	nonlinguistic	control	stimulus.	The	reverse	pattern	was	observed	for	the	tongue.	The	authors	concluded	that	 the	speech	musculature	used	for	overt	production	of	specific	phonemes	 is	selectively	 active	 in	 covert	 production	 of	 these	 phonemes.	 Livesay,	 Liebke,	 Samaras,	 and	Stanley	 (1996)	measured	EMG	 activity	 in	 the	 lips	of	 participants	 during	 rest	 and	 several	mental	 tasks.	 They	 found	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 EMG	 activity	 during	 silent	 recitation	compared	to	rest,	but	no	increase	during	non-verbal	visualisation.	A	study	on	speech	muscle	activity	 during	 dreamed	 speech	 using	 inserted	 electrodes	 suggests	 that	 the	 silent	 (non-phonated)	speech	that	occurs	in	dream	is	associated	with	EMG	activity	in	orbicularis	oris	and	mentalis	muscles	(Shimizu	&	Inoue,	1986).	Surface	EMG	activity	has	also	been	detected	in	orbicularis	 oris	 during	 auditory	 verbal	 hallucination	 (which	 has	 been	 described	 as	 inner	speech	 attributed	 to	 an	 external	 source,	 see	 Section	 2.6)	 in	 patients	 with	 schizophrenia	(Rapin,	Dohen,	Polosan,	Perrier,	&	Lœvenbruck,	2013).	A	study	by	Nalborczyk	and	colleagues	(2017)	on	induced	mental	rumination,	which	can	be	viewed	as	a	form	of	excessive	negative	inner	 speech	 (see	 Section	 2.5),	 has	 also	 found	 an	 increase	 in	 labial	 EMG	 activity	 during	rumination	 compared	 with	 a	 relaxed	 state.	 In	 addition,	 after	 rumination	 induction,	 an	orofacial	 relaxation	 session	 reduced	 labial	EMG	activity	and	had	a	beneficial	 (decreasing)	effect	on	mental	ruminations.	Although	more	work	needs	to	be	carried	out	to	disentangle	the	
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factors	 that	modulate	 lip	activity	during	rumination	(negative	affects	may	 influence	 labial	activity),	this	study	suggests	that	the	motor	system	is	involved	during	mental	rumination.	A	 further	 argument	 for	 the	 motor	 nature	 of	 inner	 language	 comes	 from	 cerebral	patterns.	As	reviewed	in	Perrone-Bertolotti	and	colleagues	(2014,	see	also	Perrone-Bertolotti	et	al.,	2016	and	Lœvenbruck	et	al.,	2018),	covert	and	overt	speech	production	both	recruit	essential	language	areas	in	the	left	hemisphere.	These	include	motor	and	premotor	cortex	in	the	frontal	lobe	including	Broca's	area	(left	inferior	frontal	gyrus),	sensory	areas	(bilateral	auditory	areas	and	Wernicke's	area	in	superior	temporal	gyrus),	and	an	associative	region,	the	left	inferior	parietal	lobule,	including	the	left	supramarginal	gyrus.	However,	there	are	differences.	Consistent	with	the	Motor	Simulation	hypothesis	and	the	notion	of	a	continuum	between	covert	and	overt	speech,	overt	speech	is	associated	with	more	activity	in	motor	and	premotor	cortices	than	inner	speech	(e.g.	Palmer	et	al.,	2001).	Moreover,	overt	speech	more	strongly	activates	 sensory	areas,	 and	 typically	auditory	areas	 (Shuster	&	Lemieux,	2005).	This	suggests	that	overt	speech	includes	sensory	activation	associated	with	the	processing	of	one’s	own	uttered	speech.	Reciprocally,	 inner	speech	 involves	 cerebral	 areas	 that	 are	not	activated	during	overt	speech	(Basho,	Palmer,	Rubio,	Wulfeck,	&	Müller,	2007).	Some	of	these	activations	(cingulate	gyrus,	left	middle	frontal	gyrus)	can	be	attributed	to	the	inhibition	of	overt	 response.	 Overall,	 these	 findings	 support	 the	 claim	 that	 inner	 speech	 is	 a	 motor	simulation	of	speech,	and	that,	as	such,	 it	shares	most	of	 the	processes	dedicated	to	overt	speech	production,	including	motor	planning	but	excluding	motor	execution.	The	processes	involved	 in	 overt	 speech	 therefore	 include	 those	 required	 for	 inner	 speech	 (except	 for	inhibition).	Some	brain	lesion	studies	support	this	view:	when	overt	speech	is	impaired,	inner	speech	 is	 either	 intact	 (Baddeley	 &	Wilson,	 1985;	 Vallar	 &	 Cappa,	 1987)	 or	 altered	 (e.g.	Levine,	Calvanio	&	Popovics,	1982;	Martin	&	Caramazza,	1982),	depending	on	the	processes	impacted.		A	few	studies	have	reported	a	dissociation	that	goes	against	this	view,	however	(e.g.	Geva,	Bennett,	Warburton,	and	Patterson,	2011a;	Langland-Hassan,	Faries,	Richardson,	and	Dietz,	2015).	They	found	that	the	patients’	performance	in	covert	speech	tasks	was	poorer	than	in	overt	speech	tasks.	As	explained	in	Lœvenbruck	et	al.	(2018),	this	dissociation	can	be	explained	 by	 limitations	 in	 the	 tasks	 used.	 Covert	 speech	 was	 only	 tested	 using	 rhyme	
Preliminary version produced by the author. 
In Lœvenbruck H. (2008). Épistémocritique, n° 18 : Langage intérieur - Espaces intérieurs / Inner Speech - Inner 
Space, Stéphanie Smadja, Pierre-Louis Patoine (eds.) [http://epistemocritique.org/what-the-neurocognitive-
study-of-inner-language-reveals-about-our-inner-space/] - hal-02039667 		
	 25	
judgment,	which	does	not	reflect	genuine	speech	production	and	which	may	well	be	easier	overtly	(even	in	healthy	patients).	
Psycholinguistic	data	Psycholinguistic	 data	 further	 indicate	 that	 motor	 processes	 and	 articulatory	representations	are	part	of	inner	speech	production.	As	 explained	 in	 Section	 2.2,	 some	 researchers	 have	 suggested	 that	 inner	 speech	 is	impoverished	at	the	articulatory	level.	This	claim	is	still	debated	however,	since	a	phonemic	similarity	 effect	 has	 in	 fact	 been	 found	 by	 Corley,	 Brocklehurst	 and	Moat	 (2011)	 during	tongue-twister	 production,	 even	 in	 a	 covert	 mode.	 Furthermore,	 a	 study	 by	 Smith,	Hillenbrand,	 Wasowicz,	 &	 Preston	 (1986)	 shows	 that	 articulatory	 content	 influences	speaking	rate	in	both	overt	and	covert	modes.	Certain	repeated	stimuli	required	more	time	to	produce	because	they	included	articulatorily	complex	sequences,	typically	alternations	of	similar	phonemes	in	the	same	syllable	position	(e.g.	“wristwatch”	longer	than	“wristband”,	because	involving	two	gestures	with	the	same	articulator	/r/-/w/	instead	of	two	gestures	with	two	different	articulators	/r/-/b/,	which	are	easier	to	anticipate	and	coordinate).	The	finding	that	articulatorily	complex	stimuli	also	took	longer	to	produce	covertly	suggests	that	subphonemic	coordination	and	anticipation	principles	are	at	play	during	inner	speech.		Moreover,	 Scott,	 Yeung,	 Gick	 and	 Werker	 (2013)	 have	 examined	 the	 influence	 of	concurrent	inner	speech	production	on	speech	perception.	Scott	and	colleagues	showed	that	the	 content	 of	 inner	 speech	 orients	 the	 perception	 of	 ambiguous	 syllables.	 In	 a	 first	experiment,	they	found	that	ambiguous	/ɑ’bɑ/	-	/ɑ’vɑ/	sequences	were	perceived	differently	depending	 on	 the	 concurrent	 inner	 production	 (more	 perception	 of	 /ɑ’bɑ/	 when	 inner	producing	/ɑ’bɑ/	and	the	opposite	pull	when	producing	/ɑ’vɑ/).	In	a	second	experiment	on	the	 same	 ambiguous	 syllables,	 they	 tested	 subphonemic	 effects.	 They	 found	 that	 inner	production	 of	 /ɑ’fɑ/	 biased	 perception	 towards	 /ɑ’vɑ/,	 and	 imagining	 /ɑ’pɑ/	 biased	perception	towards	/ɑ’bɑ/.	This	suggests	that	subphonemic	content	is	still	present	in	inner	speech.	 Overall,	 these	 findings	 suggest	 that,	 contrary	 to	 Oppenheim	 and	 Dell’s	 (2010)	findings	and	in	line	with	Corley	and	colleagues’s	(2011),	inner	speech	can	be	specified	at	the	articulatory	level.	A	recent	fMRI	study	suggests	that	inner	speech	during	reading	codes	detail	as	fine	as	voicing	(Kell,	Darquea,	Behrens,	Cordani,	Keller	&	Fuchs,	2017).	In	this	study,	the	
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number	of	voiceless	and	voiced	consonants	in	the	silently	read	sentences	was	systematically	varied.	Increased	voicing	modulated	voice-selective	regions	in	auditory	cortex.	Overall,	these	data	suggest	that	inner	speech	may	be	specified	at	the	articulatory	level.	To	wrap	up	the	arguments	presented	in	Section	3,	the	format	of	some	variants	of	inner	language	(at	least	the	expanded	deliberate	form,	see	Section	2)	is	both	motor	and	sensory.	It	can	 be	 construed	 that	 imaginary	 acts	 give	 rise	 to	 multisensory	 percepts.	 But	 these	 acts	themselves	 could	 stem	 from	prior	 sensory	goals,	 as	Paulhan	hinted	 in	1886,	which	 could	themselves	be	derived	from	more	abstract	representations	(condensed	inner	speech).	
4. Neural	mechanisms	of	inner	speech:	simulation,	prediction	and	the	feeling	of	
agency	These	many	facets	of	 inner	 language,	one	of	 the	most	significant	components	of	our	inner	space,	can	be	accounted	for	when	a	predictive	control	perspective	is	taken.	In	predictive	control	accounts,	any	action	is	accompanied	with	a	prediction	of	its	sensory	consequences.	Motor	and	sensory	aspects	are	thus	tightly	linked.	The	“Action”	view	(Jones	&	Fernyhough,	2007)	and	the	“Activity”	view	(Martinez-Manrique	&	Vicente,	2015)	hold	that	inner	language	is	 itself	 an	action.	 In	 line	with	these	views,	 and	 in	the	 framework	of	Frith	and	colleagues’	predictive	account	of	action	control	(Frith,	1992;	Frith,	Blakemore	&	Wolpert,	2000),	we	have	designed	a	neurocognitive	predictive	model	of	the	last	stage	of	inner	speech	production	(i.e.	articulatory	programming:	from	phonetic	goals	to	the	motor	program),	which	accounts	for	the	sensory	as	well	as	motor	qualities	of	inner	speech	(Lœvenbruck	et	al.,	2018).		It	can	be	speculated	that	predictive	control	also	operates	at	the	earlier	stages	of	inner	language	 production.	 Hierarchical	 predictive	 control	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 overt	 speech	control	by	Pickering	and	Garrod	(2013,	2014).	Pickering	and	Garrod’s	model	includes	pairs	of	controllers	and	predictors	that	use	efference	copy	mechanisms	to	implement	monitoring	at	 each	 level	 of	 speech	 production	 (semantics,	 syntax,	 phonology).	 Vicente	 &	 Martínez-Manrique	 (2016)	 suggest	 that	 this	 type	 of	 modelling	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 inner	 language	production.	In	Lœvenbruck	(in	preparation),	I	elaborate	on	these	suggestions	and	I	propose	a	 hierarchical	 predictive	 control	 model	 of	 language	 production,	 from	 communicative	intention	 to	 articulatory	 program,	 that	 includes	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 inner	 speech	production	(see	also	Grandchamp	et	al.,	in	preparation).	This	model,	illustrated	in	Figure	1,	
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includes	semantic,	syntactic	and	articulatory	levels.		At	 the	 lowest	hierarchical	 level,	 i.e.	articulatory	programming,	wilful	 inner	speech	 is	considered	as	deriving	from	desired	phonetic	goals,	in	a	heteromodal	format	that	integrates	multiple	sensory	representations.	As	explained	in	Lœvenbruck	et	al.	(2018),	these	desired	goals	are	transformed	into	motor	commands	by	a	controller	(or	“internal	inverse	model”).	The	 motor	 commands	 are	 inhibited	 and	 their	 efference	 copy	 is	 assigned	 as	 input	 to	 a	predictor	(or	“simulator”,	 “forward	 internal	model	of	 the	vocal	apparatus”)	 that	generates	simulated	 acts,	 which	 themselves	 provide	 predicted	 multisensory	 percepts	 (voices,	somatosensory	sensations,	facial	visemes).	These	predicted	percepts	unfold	over	time.	The	inner	voice	 in	wilful,	expanded	 inner	speech,	precisely	consists	of	 these	predicted	signals.	This	simulated	experience	occurs	earlier	than	the	actual	experience	would,	which	explains	why	inner	speech	may	take	shorter	to	be	delivered	than	overt	speech	(see	Section	2.2).	An	integrator	 transforms	 these	 multisensory	 percepts	 into	 a	 heteromodal	 representation.	 A	compararison	between	predicted	heteromodal	states	and	desired	phonetic	goals	provides	an	error	 signal	 which	 can	 be	 used	 to	 monitor	 inner	 speech.	 It	 has	 been	 claimed	 that	 the	comparison	 between	 desired	 goals	 and	 predicted	 states	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	 sense	 of	agency,	of	feeling	in	control	of	one’s	inner	speech	(Rapin	et	al.,	2013,	2016,	revised	from	Frith,	1992).	If	desired	and	predicted	states	match,	then	the	perceived	stimuli	are	self-generated.	A	defect	in	this	mechanism	can	explain	the	phenomenon	of	auditory	verbal	hallucination.	If	the	prediction	 is	 faulty,	 there	 is	 no	 match	 between	 predicted	 and	 desired	 states,	 agency	 is	defective	and	the	inner	voice	(predicted	experience)	can	feel	alien.		At	the	higher	levels,	the	predictors	are	not	simulators	of	the	vocal	apparatus	(contrary	to	Pickering	&	Garrod’s	account),	because	there	is	no	physical	apparatus	to	simulate.	Instead,	I	speculate	that	predictors	are	computational	procedures	that	transform	one	type	of	mental	representation	into	another.	Comparisons	between	desired	and	predicted	states	play	a	role	in	monitoring	at	each	level	in	the	hierarchy.	They	presumably	also	play	a	role	in	agency.	At	the	formulating	level	(syntax-phonology	encoding),	the	desired	pre-verbal	message	is	transformed	into	a	phonetic	plan	by	a	controller.	A	predictive	transformation	converts	this	plan	into	a	predicted	pre-verbal	message,	which	can	be	compared	with	the	desired	pre-verbal	message.	If	the	prediction	does	not	match	the	goal,	then	the	controller	receives	an	error	signal	
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and	is	adjusted,	and	the	lower	(articulatory	planning)	level	is	affected	(i.e.	before	articulatory	programming	even	takes	place).		Similarly,	 at	 the	 conceptualising	 level,	 a	 predicted	 communicative	 intention	 is	generated	 by	 the	 highest	 controller-predictor	 pair	 in	 the	 hierarchy.	 This	 prediction	 is	compared	with	the	original	desired	communicative	intention.	If	they	do	not	match,	then	the	controller	can	be	adjusted	and	lower	levels	in	the	hierarchy	are	affected.		
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Figure	1.	A	hierarchical	predictive	model	of	speech	production,	inspired	from	suggestions	by	
Haruno	et	al.	(2003),	Pacherie	(2008),	Pickering	&	Garrod	(2013)	and	Duffau	et	al.	(2014).		
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As	shown	in	Figure	1,	following	suggestions	and	models	by	Indefrey	(2011),	Guenther	and	Vladusich	(2012),	Hickok	(2012)	Tian	and	Poeppel	(2013),	Duffau	and	colleagues	(2014),	I	 speculate	 that	 the	 articulation	 level	 engages	 the	 auditory	 cortex	 (posterior	 superior	temporal	 gyrus,	 superior	 temporal	 sulcus),	 as	well	 as	 the	 somatosensory	 cortex	 (anterior	supramarginal	 gyrus	 and	 primary	 sensory	 cortex,	 in	 parietal	 lobe),	 together	 with	 the	temporo-parietal	 junction,	 cerebellum,	 left	 inferior	 frontal	 gyrus,	 insula,	 supplementary	motor	area,	ventral	premotor	cortex	and	lower	primary	motor	cortex	(see	Lœvenbruck	et	al.,	2018).	 Similarly,	 I	 propose	 that	 the	 formulating	 level	 involves	 the	 arcuate	 fasciculus,	 left	inferior	 frontal	gyrus,	posterior	part	of	 the	temporal	 lobe	and	of	 the	superior	 longitudinal	fasciculus	 and	 posterior	 middle	 temporal	 gyrus.	 Finally,	 the	 conceptualising	 level	presumably	engages	the	dorsolateral	prefrontal	cortex,	orbito-frontal	cortex	and	temporal	pole.	This	hierarchical	model	accounts	 for	 the	difference	between	wilful	and	spontaneous	inner	 speech.	Wilful	 inner	 speech	consists	of	predicted	multisensory	percepts	 that	unfold	over	time	and	that	result	from	computations	of	pairs	of	controller	and	predictor	models,	all	through	 the	 hierarchy,	 down	 to	 the	 lowest	 articulatory	 level.	 Spontaneous	 inner	 speech	(unbidden	 thoughts)	 is	 subjectively	 more	 evanescent	 and	 tenuous.	 I	 speculate	 that	 it	corresponds	to	mere	desired	heteromodal	states,	phonetic	goals,	deriving	from	higher	levels	(semantic	and	syntactic).	In	that	case,	inner	speech	production	is	cut	short	before	articulatory	programming.	 Therefore,	 the	 phonetic	 goals	 are	 not	 transformed	 into	 simulated	 acts	 and	their	 predicted	 sensory	 consequences,	 resulting	 in	 a	 more	 fleeting	 experience.	 I	 further	assume	 that	 during	 wilful	 inner	 speech,	 top-down	 executive	 signals	 may	 be	 issued	 in	prefrontal	cortex	to	launch	the	last	prediction	mechanism	as	well	as	well	as	to	inhibit	motor	execution.	These	signals	are	hypothesized	to	be	absent	in	spontaneous	inner	speech,	hence	the	absence	of	simulated	acts	and	their	predictions.	The	absence	of	a	prediction	itself	makes	for	the	weaker	feeling	of	agency	which	characterizes	spontaneous	inner	speech	(Gallagher,	2004).	As	this	model	shows,	the	predictive	control	mechanism,	when	functional,	therefore	contributes	to	creating	the	rich	sensory	qualities	of	 inner	speech,	as	well	as	 the	 feeling	of	agency,	 of	 awareness	 of	 our	 wilful	 verbal	 thoughts.	 Flaws	 in	 the	 prediction	 or	 in	 the	comparison	processes	could	explain	the	disruption	 in	agency	observed	 in	auditory	verbal	hallucination.	 Further	 research	needs	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 to	 better	 describe	 how	 top-down	
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signals	and	comparator	mechanisms	at	different	hierarchical	levels	all	contribute	to	agency.		
Conclusion	Inner	 language	 takes	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 our	 inner	 space,	 with	 many	 beneficial	outcomes,	which	span	from	improving	cognitive	performance	to	contributing	to	autonoetic	consciousness.	 It	 can	 become	 excessive	 (in	 verbal	 rumination),	 and	 even	 run	 amok	 (in	auditory	verbal	hallucination)	 thus	becoming	detrimental,	 and	engendering	 suffering	and	functional	disability.	The	 integrated	 approach	presented	 here,	 in	which	 inner	 language	 is	conceived	of	as	a	multimodal	act	with	multisensory	percepts,	offers	interesting	insights	into	the	various	forms	of	beneficial	and	detrimental	inner	language.	But	many	issues	still	need	to	be	resolved.	A	deeper	understanding	of	how	the	oscillations	between	wilful	and	spontaneous	forms	of	 inner	 language	may	enhance	 cognitive	performance	 could	help	people	with	high	concentration	needs.	It	could	also	be	beneficial	to	the	understanding	of	verbal	rumination	as	well	as	auditory	verbal	hallucinations.	In	addition,	although	many	of	the	subcomponents	of	inner	language	production	can	be	associated	with	specific	neural	networks	(see	Section	4),	several	 operations	 remain	 ill-described.	 It	 is	 still	 unclear	 which	 networks	 process	 the	outcomes	of	the	comparisons	supposed	to	occur	after	predictions	are	made	at	each	level	and	how	an	efficient	cognitive	control	mechanism	might	integrate	these	outcomes.	More	research	is	needed	also	on	the	processes	by	which	we	can	generate	inner	speech	with	someone	else’s	voice.	Do	we	have	a	predictor	for	each	of	the	voices	we	know?	In	 summary,	 although	 an	 integrative	 neurocognitive	model,	 gathering	 findings	 from	introspection	 and	 empirical	works,	 can	 shed	 light	on	 the	 format	of	 inner	 language,	many	issues	are	 far	 from	resolved.	 I	believe	that	endeavouring	to	 further	combine	 introspective	efforts	with	 objective	 behavioural	 and	 neurophysiological	measurements,	 should	 help	 to	better	portray	our	inner	linguistic	space.	
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